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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * *
VIRGIL H. CAMP I
Plaintiff-Appellant,.
Civil No. 15,672

vs.
DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOCIATION, et al. ,
Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued to obtain judgment that a certain van was
"medical equipment" under an insurance certificate provided by
the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the trial, the matter was submitted on certain agreed
evidence and the court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, gave judg~nt

for defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an order affirming the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff's teenage son, Jeff Camp, suffered a neck injury

in 1976 while jumping on a trampoline.

As a result of the injury,

Jeff is now paralyzed completely up to the level of the nerves from
the sixth or seventh cervical vertebrae, which means that he has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shoulders are disabled, although some function remains.

As a

dependent of the plaintiff, Jeff had health insurance under a certificate of insurance issued by Deseret Mutual Benefit Association
by virtue of the plaintiff's employment as an insurance agent
associated with Beneficial Life Insurance Co.

The certificate of

insurance under which Jeff was covered provided benefits in relevant
part as follows:
TYPE II BENEFITS
Benefits are payable for expenses incurred by you or your
dependent resulting from bodily injury or sickness on the
basis of 80% of usual, reasonable and customary charges
for:
6. MEDICAL SUPPLIES &~D EQUIPMENT--charges for medical
supplies and medical equipment prescribed by a physician
including oxygen; blood and other fluids to be injected into
the circulatory system; artificial limbs and eyes; casts,
splints, trusses, braces, orthopedic shoes, crutches, surgical.
dressings; and rental of special medical equipment recommended
by a physician such as a wheelchair, hospital type bed, iron
lung or oxygen equipment.
7.
AMBULANCE--charges for room and board incurred while
confined in an Extended Care Facility, provided such confinement is for treatment of an acute illness or injury, commences
within five days after discharge from a hospital and such
confinement is recommended by a physician for purposes of
convalescing from such bodily injury or sickness. Custodial
care is ineligible for benefit.
12. TRANSPORTATION--charges for necessary transportation
by railroad or regularly scheduled airline to and from the
.
nearest facility equipped to furnish necessary medical treatmen.
not otherwise obtainable.
[Insurance certificate, Exhibit A
to the complaint, at 14-16, R 20-21]
The term

11

custodial care 11

,

mentioned in subpart 8 of the above exce~:

from the certificate, is defined on page 51 of the insurance certificate as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The term custodial care as used in this booklet means main~
tenance of a pat~ent beyond the acute phase of injury or
sickness. [R-38]
After the accident, Jeff spent about a month at Cottonwood
Hospital and then was transferred to University Medical Center, where
lhe stayed from late July, 1976, until his discharge on October 15,
1976.

While at the University Medical Center, Jeff was under the

care of a rehabilitative medicine team, including Dr. Pedro Escobar,
I

his attending physician, a specialist in rehabilitative medicine;
J~

Woolsey, a social worker; and others, including a psychologist,

a physical therapist, and other doctors.
I

Some time prior to Jeff's discharge, plaintiff asked Woolsey,
the social worker, and other members of the team about the care of
Jeff which would be necessary when Jeff went home.

A member of

the team suggested that Dr. Escobar might recommend a speciallyequipped van, to enable Jeff to travel about.

Woolsey advised the

plaintiff, however, that the expense of purchasing such a van would
·probably not be reimbursed by plaintiff's health insurance.

The

' following ensued :
Q.

(By Mr. Bushnell) It may be repetitious, but
go ahead, answer.

A.

(By Mr. Woolsey) Okay, that I was not sure
if the insurance company would cover the
purchase of a van and equipment.

Q.

What did he [Mr. Camp] say to that?

A.

Well as I recall, he said, I think, that
they; the insurance company, if they are not
covering this kind of thing that.they ought
to and I would like to purchase ~t, to see.

Q.

Fine.

·n:

<

And you are the one that put in
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A.

Right.

Q.

You did that even though you weren't sure
whether it was covered or not?

A.

True.

Q.

Why did you have these reservations in your
mind as whether they would approve it or not?

A.

Well because from experience here on
rehabilitation, insurance companies, other
insurance companies have not, you know,
covered a vehicle, purchase of a car or a van
for a patient. The only agencies that have
done anything in that regard are the State
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation who
purchased some adaptive equipment for the
patient, such as hand controls for the
hydraulic lift, if the patient is a
quadriplegic and they are approached as a
last resort for financial help to get these
things.

Q.

Do you know of any instances where an
insurance company has in fact approved and
purchased a motor vehicle itself?

A.

Not with my experience here, I haven't.
[Woolsey deposition at 17-19.]

Later, when Jeff's discharge from the hospital was near,
plaintiff prepared a form of letter for the signature of Dr.
Escobar, recommending certain equipment for Jeff.

The purposeo:

this letter was to support an insurance claim for the equipment
plaintiff and his family would need to care for Jeff:
Q.

[Mr. Bushnell] Is it fair, based on what
you've said, to say then that you initiated
the precise, specific request to the doctor
for a letter prescribing the van so you could
present it to the insurance company?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

[Mr. Camp] Prescribing all the equipment, the
answer is yes.

Q.

Including the van?

A.

Including the van.

[Deposition of Camp at 18.]

In response to plaintiff's request, Dr. Escobar wrote a letter,
dated October 11, 1977, in which he lists the equipment which[W]ill be absolutely essential in order for
Jeff to function as independently as
possible.
1.

A van equipped with power steering . • • and an
automatic wheel chair lift.

2.

A standard wheelchair

3.

An automatic hospital bed • • •

4.

A large tire commode chair • • •

5.

A bath shelf
(Exhibit D-1, deposition of Escobar)

Plaintiff later filed his claim with DMBA and was reimbursed for
all of the items mentioned in Dr. Escobar's letter, except for
the specially equipped van, with respect to which the company
denied his claim.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed this suit.

Defendants took the depositions of Camp, Woolsey and
Escobar during the pendency of this action.

Dr. Escobar

testified that there was no medical necessity for the van; he
stated that:
Q.

[Mr. Bushnell] It is true that the van is
not for medication or for treatment of any
physical condition of the plaintiff?

A.

[Dr. Escobar] Yes, sir.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

It is just what it purports to be-transportation.

A.

To the hospital, to school.

Q.

It is not like braces, and other things that
you have to have with reference to bodily
function; it is for transportation?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You have emphasized, however, that having the
availability of a van does serve the
emotional needs of the patient?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You don't expect the van to be of any
assistance so far as rehabilitation
physically is concerned?

A.

Of his physical condition, no, but it will permit
him to pursue education.
[Deposition of Escobar at 56-57] (emphasis added)

Another objective of the van is to provide recreation.
Deposition of Escobar at 63 line 22.
At the trial, it was stipulated that the deposition of
Escobar, Camp, Woolsey and Stewart should be received in evidence,
together with the exhibits to the complaint and affidavits of
Lorin Miles and Stewart.

The effect of the stipulation was to

allow the trial court to weigh the evidence, rather than be
restricted by the rules applicable to sununary judgment.

(R-322)

After hearing argument, the trial court ordered that judgment
enter for defendants, finding as a matter of fact and law
that the requested equipment was not "medical equipment" as
provided by the

con~ract.

(R 131-33)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

POINT I
THE MERE RECOMMENDATION BY A PHYSICIAN OF
EQUIPMENT FOR A PATIENT DOES NOT MAKE THE
EQUIPMENT MEDICAL IN NA RE.
The insurance contract relied upon by the plaintiffs refers
to "special medical equipment" (in contrast with Kennen v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 59 Misc.
2d 536, 299 N.YS.2d 880 (1969), which referred to "equipment",
a broader term than the phrase "medical equipment") •

Several

cases have considered the meaning of the adjective medical in
the context of services or equipment recommended by a physician.
The most recent of these, Savaria v. DiSano, 373 A.2d 820 (R.I.
1977) considered a claim of a disabled employee who sought to be
provided with an electric wheelchair and an automatic elevator.
The court sustained the Rhode Island workmen's compensation
commission's order granting the wheelchair and denying the
elevator.

The employee's physician had remarked with respect

to the elevator that it would give the employee some change of
environment and a measure of safety in moving about.

On the

other hand, however, the physician stated that the employee's
health would not be improved nor his mobility increased.

The

workman's compensation commission reasoned in denying the elevator
that it would not relieve the effects of the injury but that
the elevator was rather more a convenience item.

In sustaining

the Workman's compensation Commission the court reasoned,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1
In short, it is not enough that the means used to
relieve the employee from the effects of the injury
have been prescribed by his physician to be chargeable
to the employer under the statute, they must be medical
in nature as well • • • . In this case • • . the benefit
is ~ndubitably convenient and perhaps even necessary to
rel1eve the employee from the effects of his injury
but there is nothing in this record that compelled the
commission to conclude that in the circumstances
described the elevator or lift was medical in nature.
373 A.2d at 820, 822. [emphasis supplied]
In a similar case, Lutman v. American Shoe Mach. Co., 151
S.W.2d 701

(Mo.App. 1941) the question was whether a physician

had treated the plaintiff for an injury within a period of
1 imitations.

The court held that the doctors recommending to the

patient that he wear a mask to protect him from dust was not
medical treatment.

The court reasoned

as follows:

As to Dr. Reuter's advice that the respondent be taken
off the work in question or be given a mask to wear 'if
the dust was aggravating him', we do not believe it can
reasonably be said that such advice was 'medical
treatment.'
It is not even suggested that medicine or
drugs were advised or given by the doctor.
It
certainly was not surgical treatment' or 'hospital
treatment'.
Furthermore the advice was not given to
cure and relieve the effects of the injury but was for
the purpose of preventing future aggravation thereof.
The grouping of the words "medical, surgical and
hospital treatment" by the legislature shows plainly
what the lawmakers had in mind and clearly does not
include mere diagnosis, nor can it be said to include
advice that could be given by a layman. The above words
not be1ng of a peculiar or technical nature 'shall be
taken in their plain and ordinary and usual sense.'
151 S.W.2d 701, 709 (emphasis added)
The provision of a automobile vehicle such as a van to the
plaintiff's son, Jeff, is like the advice given by the doctor
to the plaintiff Lutman, that Lutman should wear a face mask or'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

working around dust.

There is no special medical knowledge

involved in the recommendation in either case1 for Jeff a van is
certainly a source of independence, convenience, and recreation
but that is exactly the function that automobiles provide for all
of us.
A Texas court considered the question of what is "medical"
in Red v. Group Medical and Surgical Service, 298 S.W.2d 623
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).

A child who had suffered from spinal

meningitis was rendered deaf by the disease.

The attending

physician recommended that the child be entered as a student
at the Houston School for Deaf Children.

The plaintiff sought

to obtain a court order that the matter was covered under a
clause of the health insurance contract providing for payment
of fees of "the attending physician and consulting physician and
specialists to whom the patient may be referred".

The court

rejected the notion that a lip reading instructor was a specialist
under the contract, stating,-We do not think that the educational, schooling, or
training fees paid by plaintiff for teaching his son
the new skill of lip reading fall within the insuring
clause of the contract in that even though they be
classed as professional fees of specialists, the ~olicy
still does not contemplate fees of other than med~cal
or surgical specialists--certainly not those of
educational instructors of any class.
The court remarked that part of its reasoning was based on the
finding of the doctor as follows-The doctor testified that on his examination and
diagnosis he found the hearing nerves completely
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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destroyed and that there was nothing he could do from
a medical standpoint to cure the nerve condition and
restore the hearing.
298 S.W.2d 623, 625, 626.
Dr. Escobar testified that the van recommended for Jeff
would not improve Jeff's physical condition; rather it would
serve to aid him in his education and recreation.

As in the Red

case, these objectives are not medical and therefore are not
comprehended in the phrase "medical equipment".
POINT II
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE INSURANCE CERTIFICATE
DOES NOT INCLUDE AN AUTOMOBILE OR VAN, NOR
DOES IT INCLUDE THE SPECIAL EQUIPMENT CLAIMED
BY PLAINTIFF WITH RESPECT TO THE VAN.
Considered as an abstract proposition it is clear that an
automobile or van or bus is not a medical apparatus or device.
The old definition of "van", which is a contraction of the word
"caravan," was "an enclosed wagon or motortruck used for
transportation of goods or animals. "
Dictionary 1292 (1975).

Webster's New Call egiate

There is a more recent usage of the

term "van" referring to a type of vehicle which was recently
developed for use as a light truck, which is now used for
personal transportation like an ordinary automobile.

Even so

the ordinarily understood function of a van or of an automobile
is for transportation, for convenience, perhaps for recreation,
perhaps for hauling goods, but not for any medical purpose.
plaintiff in Nallan v. Motion Picture Studio
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

Mechanic Union Loca.l No. 52, 49 App. Div. 2d 365, 375 NYS 2d 164
(1975) reversed on other grounds, 40 NY 2d 1042, 360 NE 2d 353
(1976) sought to receive workmen compensation coverage for his
transportation expense.

The main point in which the case turned

and which it was ultimately reversed was whether or not he was an
employee of the union.

A subsidiary point was however that the

plaintiff was not entitled to be provided with an automobile.
The court reasoned as follows:
"A motor vehicle is not a medical apparatus or device
within the scope of Section 13 of the Workmen's
Compensation Law."
There are three cases in holding that under New York Workmen's
Compensation Law an automobile is not a medical apparatus or
device.

Nallan v. Motion Pictures Studio

Mechanic Union Local No. 52, supra, De Croix v. N. Sumergrade
& Sons, 20 App. Div. 2d 735, 246 NYS 2d 852; and Carniato v.

Wheeler Corporation, 7 App. Div. 2d 328, 183 NYS 2d 298.

The

Nallan case has some close analogies to the present case; in it
the plaintiff was a paraplegic, and using his automobile, he was
able to be partially active, to hold down a job and so forth.
Notwithstanding the circumstances, the court rejected his claim
for the automobile.

The reasoning of the two prior cases,

De Croix and Carniato, was that "the enumeration of medical aids
expressed in this statutory form would under ordinary canons of
construction exclude non-medical instruments such as a motor
vehicle."

De croix v. N. Sumergrade

&

Sons, 20 App. Div. 2d 735

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The thinking of the New York workmen's compensation cases
is somewhat like that in the Medicare regulations.

The definition

of medical equipment is given as follows therein:
D~rable medical equipment is equipment which
w~thstand repeated use, (2) is primarily and

(1) can

customarily used to serve a medical purpose, (3)
is enerall not useful to a erson in the absence
o ~llness or ~nJury, and 4 ~s appropr~ate or use
in the horne.
Equipment Presumptively Medical.
--Items such
as wheelchairs and hospital beds are presumptively
medical in nature . . • •
Equipment Presumptively Nonmedical. --Equipment
which is primarily and customarily used for a nonmedical purpose may not be considered "medical"
equipment for which payment can be made under
Medicare. This is true even though the item has
some remote medically related use. For example, in
the case of a cardiac patient, an air conditioner
might possibly be used to lower the room temperature
to reduce fluid loss in the patient and to restore
an environment conducive to maintenance of the proper
fluid balance. Nevertheless, because the primary
and customary use of an air conditioner is a nonmedical
one, an a~r conditioner cannot be deemed to be medical
equipment for which payment can be made."
CCH Medicare and Medicaid Reporter paragraph 3144.
(emphasis supplied)
A separate section of the same source mentions the word
appliances.
[A]ppliances which customarily serve a nonmedical
purpose but which may serve a rn~dical purpos~ in a
specific case . . . may be cons~dered as rned~cal
appliances only where (l) the physician's plan of
treatment specifically includes the use of such
appliances in connection with ~he patient:s treatment
regimen, and specifies any l~m~tat~ons wh~ch should b~
placed on the use of the appliance due to the pat~ent s
condition, and (2) the appliance may be expected to
contribute meaningfully to the treatment of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on

ill ness or injury or to improve the functioning of a
malformed body member.
CCH Medicare and Medicaid Reporter paragraph 1467.
(emphasis supplied)
Dr. Escobar specifically testified that the van will not
contribute to the treatment of Jeff Camp's malady, insofar as his
paralysis is concerned, nor will it improve the functioning of
his disabled members.

Deposition of Escobar at 56.

Under the reasoning of both the New York workmen's compensation
cases and the Medicare regulations, it appears clear that there
is no basis for including a van or automobile under the definition
of medical equipment.

Furthermore, the Medicare Regulations

provide a basis for distinguishing between a wheelchair and an
automobile.

A wheel chair is "generally not useful to a person

in the absence of illness or injury and • • . is appropriate for
use in the home • "
The insurance certificate in this case provides separately
for certain covered expenses.

These are listed as medical

supplies, ambulance, extended care, and transportation, insofar
as they are relevant to this case.

Plaintiff has the duty to

show that his claim is covered under one or more of these headings.
In Urtado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 528 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1974), the
insured had been driving a car owned by a relative, while the
definitions in his policy excluded a car owned by a relative
from its "non-owned" coverage.

The court remarked, quoting

from the opinion in the intermediate appeals court,
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l
Definitions of terms used in the insuring clause
frequently have the effect of defining, and therefore
limiting, coverage. 528 P.2d 222, 223.
The court denied coverage.

By setting out several heads of

insurance coverage, the DMBA policy sets up a scheme defining,
and in the sense of Ortado, .limiting the coverage.

It is not

enough, to sustain a claim under the policy, to merely point to
the overall nature of the insurance.

For example, in Drumm v.

Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio, 320 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio

l , the

insured, Patricia, was sent to a special school for "milieu"
therapy.
The essential concept of "milieu therapy" is
that everything that happens to the patient
has a considerable psychological impact . . •
This court passes no judgment upon the validity
or effectiveness of "milieu therapy" but
because the Plan clearly covers only certain
enumerated services and supplies, an award of
the full charge for "milieu therapy" amounts
to an impermissible judical extension of an
insurance contract beyond the limits clearly
established by the policy. Courts are bound
by the unambiguous terms of an insurance
contract and cannot enlarge or extend the
contract by implication so as to embrace an
object distinct from that originally contemplated
by the parties.
320 N.E.2d 713, 716.
(Emphasis
added)
The policy under which Jeff is covered provides transportation
expense and ambulance expense according to its provisions, and
the pol icy does not cover the purchase of a motor vehicle for thi
beneficiary.
There is another interesting analogy raised by the

~

case; in effect, the program of rehabiJitative medicine conducte:
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I

by or. Escobar is a form of "milieu therapy", a treatment aimed

at the whole personality of Jeff Camp, rather than just his
paralysis.

While the broad scope of this program is admirable,

it is not insured by the insurance certificate now before the
court, and to extend coverage to the van simply because the van
is necessary as a part of this program is not justified by the
language of the certificate, referring to medical equipment.

I

Another contractual provision bears on the treatment of
the whole man; the certificate provides that custodial care is
not covered.

This raises the implication that "milieu therapy",

which by its nature extends beyond the acute phase of an illness
or injury, into the future, is not covered.
The objective of Dr. Escobar's recommendation of a van,
that is the education, independence, recreation, and convenience
of Jeff Camp, is more a question of maintenance than it is of
acute care.
for example.

A van is a machine which can replace a chauffeur,
This is illustrated by Borgmann v. Commissioner, 438

F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1971).

The taxpayer, Borgmann, sought to

establish that the salary of Mrs. Holtzmann, his housekeeper, was
deductible medical expense.

Her function was to summon aid when

he was ill and to provide him with housekeeping services, doing
things for him which may have overtaxed his weak heart.

The

housemaid's function
[D]id not require the special skills of a nurse or
one trained in medicine.
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[D]id not bear such a direct and proximate therapeutic
relation to some physical or mental function or
structure of the body as to constitute a deductible
medical expense.
In Jeff Camp's situation the plaintiff seeks to obtain

reimburs~t

for a C.B. radio, which has the same function as Mrs. Holtzmann
the housekeeper--to summon aid in an emergency.

Other equipment

to be installed in the vehicle, notwithstanding that it may be
necessary for Jeff or useful for him, is no more proximately
related to Jeff's paralysis than was Mrs. Holtzrnann's aid to
Mr. Borgmann's weak heart, for purposes of determining whether
these aids are "medical."

There is no doubt that the policy

would not cover the employment of a chauffeur or housekeeper
for Jeff under the heading of Medical Equipment or under its
other clauses; machinery purchased for the same purpose is also
not covered.
The commonsense idea that transportation equipment is not
medical, in the understanding of the reasonable man, is illustrat
by Morris v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 72 N.M. 395, 384 P.2d
465 (1963).

The plaintiff and her daughter were injured while

covered by a broad automobile medical pol icy which in very gener:
terms provided for coverage of medical expenses.

A relative

cared for them during part of their recovery, because no hospita:
was convenient to the office where the mother received her thera:
· d for medl. cal expenses on behal
Later a certain amount was c 1 alme
of the relative.

The court reasoned that the policy did not
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I

limit coverage to services performed by professionals or in
institutions such as hospitals; the court disallowed, however,
a sum requested to reimburse for transporting the daughter to
school each day because the girl wore a cast on her leg due to
the accident.

The court stated--

"This item is beyond the scope of the policy."

384 P.2d 465, 469.

The same reasoning applies to the policy here; transportation,
whether made necessary by a cast on the leg or paralysis, is not
a medical concern.

Therefore the judgment should be affirmed.
POINT III

THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE DISPUTED
PORTION OF THE CERTIFICATE
In his brief the plaintiff merely documents the existence
of the dispute over the interpretation of the certificate, which
does not necessarily establish that the certificate is ambiguous.
Just because there is a controversy and the parties assert
differing interpretations, it does not follow that ambiguity has
been established.

O'Meara v. American States Insurance Co., 148

Ind. App. 56 2 , 2 6 8 N. E. 2d 1 0 9, 11 0.
Instruments are not rendered ambiguous due to the fact
that the parties do not now agree upon the proper
construction to be given them.
Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F.Supp. 808, 811 (D. W. Va.) ·
The brief of the plaintiff shows that there is actually
considerable agreement between the parties about the meaning of
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l
the contract.

Like all contracts, an insurance policy must be

I
I

viewed as a whole before it is concluded that there •;s an arnbiguir
in the policy.
There are authoritative statements to the same effect in
Utah cases.

For example, in Fawcett v. Security Benefit Assoc.,

104 P.2d 214 (Utah 1940), the court reasoned,
Even though a particular provision of a contract
of insurance be susceptible of more than one meaning
the construction of such provision more favorable to
the assured will not be adopted if other provisions
of the entire contract clearly resolve the ambiguity
in favor of the contrary construction.
104 P.2d 214, 218.
The same principle is supported by Auto Leasing Co •. v.
Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264 (1958)
where the court was faced with a dispute over whether there was
coverage of a newly purchased automobile intended to replace a
covered automobile.

The plaintiff argued that there was

uncertainty in the contract and that therefore the contract
should be construed in favor of coverage.

The court stated

however,
But that rule has no application unless there is
some genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language upon which reasonable minds may differ
as to the meaning. That requirement is not
satisfied because a party may get a different
meaning by placing a forced or constrained.
construction on it in accordance with h~s ~nterest.
The test to be applied is: Would the meaning be
plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and
understanding, viewing the matter fairly and
reasonably, in accordance with usual natural
meaning of the words, and in the light of
existing circumstances including the purchase
of the policy.
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The court held coverage was not available.

Similarly, in our case

the plaintiff is contending that ambiguity is introduced into the
policy because the injury of the Plaintiff's child is so all
pervasive that it effects all his daily activities and that
therefore his need for an automobile is different than that of an
ordinary citizen for an automobile.

Nevertheless, the net result

of what the plaintiff is contending for would amount to a
revision of the contract and would provide for coverage of
transportation costs by means other than those provided in the
contract.
Another case involving interpretation of an insurance
contract was Marriott v. Pacific National Life Insurance Co., 24
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970) in which the court reasoned that
before the contract could be interpreted, all of the language
must be construed together and that in view of that reasoning the
court rejected plaintiff's contention, that the death of the
plaintiff's decedent implied that the plaintiff's decedent was
"disabled" for the purposes of certain insurance.

As a matter of

interpretation, each clause of the contract lends meaning to the
others.

A term is not ambiguous if fair inferences from other

parts give meaning to the questioned part.

Fawcett v. Security

Benefit Association, supra.
It is to be noted that a liberal interpretation of an
i~surance policy or contract does not necessarily imply that all

doubts are to be resolved against the insurance company.
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1

To take the ordinary and obvious meaning of words
~nd construe them in the light of surrounding facts
~s the fundamental rule of construction.
When that
fails, other so called rules which might be better
be called expedients may be resorted to.
National 0 tical Co. v. United States Fidelit
an Guarantee Company, 235 P.
43 Colo. 1925).

I

In construing a contract a court should look to the intentio:
of the parties and take the point of view of the average man.
Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 106 Utah 184,
14 7 p • 2d 31 9 •

In view of the foregoing authorities the insurance

in issue in this case is not ambiguous.

certifica~

The word "medical" as

it is commonly understood does not include automobiles or other
automotive vehicles such as vans.

This common acceptation of

the phrase "medical equipment" therefore implies that there is
no dispute as to the interpretation of the phrase "medical
equipment" which would detain reasonable men.
Furthermore, the objectives of the doctor in prescribing
the van is not within those objectives covered by the policy.
The insurance is for health, not for the independence or
recreation of the insured.

The court should not, of course,

rewrite the policy to reach these uninsured objectives.

The cas<

of cotton States Insurance Co. of Atlanta, Georgia v.
Diamond Housing Mobile Homes, 430 F. Supp 503 (Dis. of Ala.
1977) held that the scope of an exclusionary provision must be
determined in light of the entire insurance policy.

A rule

requiring the interpretation of ambiguity in the favor of the
t.lOn
of ofthe
lang~~
" sane
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Defendants contend that plaintiff's interpretation of the
insurance policy is not based on sound principles.

A review of

the entire policy shows that transportation and custodial care
expenses which are a substantial aspect of the van's purpose are
covered by other portions of the policy in a manner which would
not provide coverage for the expense of the van.

The provision

of a van is not a question of substituting for lost function of
the body of Jeff Camp.
by

van.

Nobody ambulates or gets around naturally

The objective for providing for ambulation by wheelchair

is a covered expense but the objective of providing a van is not.
A reading of the insurance policy shows that it was never

intended by the parties to provide coverage in a form now claimed
by

the plaintiff.

It is not the function of the court to rewrite

the policy or torture the meaning of the policy to extend such
coverage at this time.

Torrington Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co. , 21 6 S . E . 2 d 54 7 (S . C . 1 9 7 5) •
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HIS
CLAIM IS WITHIN THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS
OF THE CERTIFICATE AND THEREFORE HIS
SUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The duty of the plaintiff in an insurance case is to show
that his claim fails within the express provisions of the policy.
First ~ational Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co., 162 Cal. 61, 121 P.

321.

This plaintiff has attempted to do by arguing a number of
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cases.

The first, Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19 Utah 2d

297, 431 P.2d 130 (1967) is cited by plaintiff for the idea th~
DMBA, the defendant, is bound by the opinion of the insured's
doctor.
(1)

DMBA contends here, however, that the expense must be

one which is medically related and ( 2) one which is prescribe(

by a doctor, and that these two requirements are independent is
shown by Point I of this memo.

There is no provision in the

Deseret Mutual Contract, as there was in Amicone, for the decisio:
of any doctor to be binding and therefore Amicone is not applicab.
to this situation.
Plaintiff's second point is to merely set forth the general
proposition that insurance policies are construed, when ambiguity
exists, in favor of the insured.

Defendants contend that there

is no ambiguity in this policy, that its plain language clearly
excludes this claim of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the principle

that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the insured has
no application here.

Furthermore, the finding of the DMBA claill:

cornmi ttee that the claim for the van was for transportation exper:;
is clearly correct.
The case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Jacober, 10 Cal. 3d 193, 514 p.2d 953 (1973) is merely cumulative
authority on the principle that the contract ought to be
interpreted in favor of the insured where ambiguity exists.
Furthermore, Jacober concerned a contract which involved the
interpretation of an exclusion clause.

The issue in this case
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is not exclusion, but rather the definition of the insurance.
The plaintiff makes a causation argument to define the word
"medical".

In effect, the definition of "medical" is "anything

required by reason of the impairment of a person," as follows:
Jeff is paralyzed, therefore, he needs a van to get around and
therefore the van is a necessary consequence of his impairment,
and is "medical".
too all-inclusive.

The mistake in this argument is that it is
All people need to be independent, all people

need recreation and all people of Jeff's age need to travel to
school and for these purposes it is convenient for them to have
an automobile or a van.

The plaintiff's son, Jeff, wants an

automobile or the doctor recommended an automobile for him for
the same reasons that anyone would buy an automobile, that is,
for convenience to get around, to be independent, to enjoy
recreation, and so forth.

These purposes, however, are not

medical when they are considered with respect to everyone else,
all the normal members of the community, and they are not medical
with respect to Jeff.

The van will lessen Jeff's dependence upon

the kind of services normally classed as custodial care, that is,
lifting him in and out of vehicles, chauffeuring him around,
calling for help in emergencies, and so forth.
covered under the contract, however.

These are not

It is an oversimplification

to say that because Jeff finds a van convenient and because it
reduces the impact upon his life of his impairment that the van
is therefore medical.
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It should also be mentioned that in Fassio v. Montana
Physicians Service, 553, P.2d 998 (Mont. 1976) the question
was whether the defendant should pay for certain services of a
physician which were condemned by the medical community as
experimental.

The dispute, in effect, in Fassio was between good

and bad medicine.

The question was not whether it was medical

or not, but whether it was good medicine.

Thus the Fassio case

does not speak to the main issue of this case, to wit, whether
or not an automobile can be considered as an item of medical
expense.
CONCLUSION
The following points should be emphasized:

(l)

plaintiff

supplied the motive and impetus for preparing the doctor's
recommendation of the van in a form which, when submitted to the
insurance company, would 1 ook like a prescription;

( 2) The Plair.:

has failed to argue, in his brief, that the function of the vu,
as it is to be used by Jeff, is medical rather than recreationaL
educational or social;

(3)

Defendant DMBA contends that a van is

not medical, and it has formulated its rates on the supposition
that a van is not covered; to hold otherwise would open the doer
to many similar articles and would injure the company in its

ea

to hold the line against higher prices and premiums; and (4)
Plaintiff has failed to cite any direct authority supporting hl!
claim.
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Dr. Escobar stated, on page 58 of his deposition, that the
only contact he had with plaintiff had to do with the preparation
of an insurance claim.

Q.

(Mr. Bushnell)
Primarily, then, that was one
conversation when Mr. Camp carne to you alone,
gave you a sheet of paper with some items on
it and said, "I would like to have this
letter to present to the insurance company
and I would like you to specify what is the
best equipment available for use for my son
considering his condition?

A.

(Dr. Escobar)

Yes, Sir.

At the deposition of Jim Woolsey, Jeff's social worker,
testimony was given confirming that plaintiff gave the impetus
for preparing the requisition for the van in a form to be
submitted to the insurance carrier.
Q.

A.

(Mr. Bushnell)
No, Mr. Camp in his discussions,
had he said, "If this can qualify as medical
equipment, that means it is probably covered.
If I could get a requisition to present to the
insurance company I can get them to review it."
Anything like that?
(Mr. Woolsey)

Yes .

Q.

So is it correct to summarize your testimony that
the requisition was made at the request of Mr.
Camp to present to the insurance company to see
whether they would or would not approve it; is
that right.

A.

Well, that is true throughout the consultations
with the doctor.

Q.

But he indicated that he wanted you to requisition,
he wanted the staff, the department, the doctor,
to recommend the van as being the best equipment
for his son?

A.

Right .
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Q.

Did you have more than one discussion with Mr. Camp
about this?

A.

Yes. Like I mentioned before, it seemed like we
had several conversations, you know, getting close
to the time of discharge, "What are all of the
things that Jeff would be needing so he could
pursue his life," transportation being a great
necessity for Jeff to continue with, you know,
pursuing school, that kind of thing.

Q.

You said several conversations?

A.

Yes

Q.

Would you say that is three, four . . . or what?

A.

Half a dozen.

Q.

And would most of these have taken place prior to
the preparing of the document previously mentioned?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And in those you had specific discussions about
the van on more than one occasion?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then did you talk to the doctor on more than one
occasion about the van?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How many times would you say you talked to the
doctor about it?

A.

I would say maybe three or four times.
[Deposition of Woolsey at 32-34 .] (Emphasis supplied)

Earlier in this memorandum defendants set out the language
of the plaintiff when he was asked about the preparation of t~
prescription of the van--

Q.

[Mr. Bushnell]
Is it fair, based upon what
you've said, to say then that you initiated
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to the doctor for
so you cou d present
A.

(Mr. Camp)

yes.

Prescribing all the equipment, the is

Q.

Including the van?

A.

Including the van.
Ibeposition of Camp at 18]

(Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing testimony shows, therefore, that the prescription
prepared by Dr. Escobar was motivated by plaintiff's request for
it, in order to test the insurance policy, rather than exclusively
by the doctor's judgment as to whether the van was medical.

The

doctor testified, of course, that the function of the van was
for transportation, for education, for recreation--but not for
the medical needs of Jeff.

The van, according to the doctor, is

not a treatment of any physical condition of Jeff's, nor is it,
like a wheelchair, helpful for Jeff to get around the house and
take care of his body functions, going to the bathroom, eating,
having a shower, and the like.

It is for transportation, and

that is why plaintiff's claim was denied by DMBA.
The rates of DMBA health coverage are set based upon
anticipated payments on behalf of members.

In setting these

rates, the company must consider its experience, the scope of the
coverage, and trends in health care prices.

It is common

knowledge that such prices are now rising rapidly.

The premiums

',vhich have been in force have been based upon the assumption that
items like automobiles and other transportation equipment are not
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covered as "medical equipment".

If the court were to order the

company to pay the claim in this case, the result would be an
upset of these calculations and loss to the company resulting in
increased premiums to members.

The risk is particularly great

because of the amount of expense involved in a van costing
$10,000.00, or perhaps for the rental of an air-conditioned
apartment needed by a patient to provide him with "independence,"
or to buy a patient a typewriter or even stenographic services,
to help him with his education, or perhaps to buy him a specially·
equipped snowmobile, to help with recreation.

The conclusion

is that a motor vehicle, not being medical in nature, is not
covered.
Plaintiff's argument is limited in scope.

Not having any

authority, apparently, for the proposition that a motor vehicle
is medical in nature, he argues that it is logical to consider a
van as medical.
principle.

The law, however, proceeds on a different

As Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court

once wrote, "A page of experience is worth a volume of logic."
Plaintiff's argument shows no experience, no authority.

Pl ainti:

relies on the serious injury Jeff has suffered, and its allpervasive effects on his life, to transmute in the court's mind
an ordinary motor vehicle, useful for transportation, into rnedk
equipment.

This court should resist such arguments and affi~

the judgment of.

Elton v. Bankers Life

2d 213, 516 P.2d 165 (1973)

&

Casual tv Co.

I

30 utah

(Court dismissed claim of widow
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accidental death policy).
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SERVED a copy of the foregoing brief by mail this ~ day
June, 1978, to the offices of Thomas T. Billings, Esq., 79 South

State, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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